Gamification – vote yes

Gamification is the application of game elements and techniques to bring about .. well, mostly substantial customer behavior change. It has been applied to improving sales productivity, increasing tool and product adoption, frequency of product use and retention (think airline frequent flyer miles) among other applications in business.

Everyone likes to play games. Games that string us along to achieving milestones, rewarding users with higher level of play or more capability within the game itself are usually most popular. Certain games like Angry Birds that tap into an urge that most of us have sometimes,  “shoot it down”, use fresh organic graphics, and rack up points along the way are hugely addictive to boot.

So why not apply some of these elements that find us addicted to business? It has been done before, is being researched as we speak and bodes well for the future. The key, according to a research paper published by Aberdeen Group on using gamification for improving sales effectiveness, is in tapping into the right type of “non-cash motivator” for the salesforce. Most of the time it is as simple as recognizing the sales people! Some value it a close second to financial rewards. Another effective motivator is “peer competition” and the race to “funnel exit” which is really movement of a lead down the sales funnel.

The important asset that differentiates how well gamification can be deployed within the firm is the deployment ability. Bunchball pioneered gamification solutions, but now there are more players in the market such as Hoopla and iActionable, among others. Interesting items to consider when deploying the gamification initiative to the field include:

  1. Are the game mechanics easily configurable, and changes effective on-the-fly?
  2. Is there an obvious way to measure the return on investment of the gamification environment?
  3. Is the system transparent in determining the winners and the losers in the game?
  4. Does the leaderboard data integrate with the customer relationship management system?

These factors when thought through well during the planning phase will serve to enrich the gamification environment and provide for more feedback for the iterative process, that implementing business gamification really and truly is. More on that on this blog site.. later!

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Best Buy’s discovery-based innovation model- Ideating from the ground-up

Best Buy used Strategos Innovation Practitioners to create a disruptive innovation model. Strategos laid out a model based on discovery and rapid-prototyping that Best Buy adopted after pulling in 35 different senior managers and directors from various parts of the organization to work on the discovery, action, and realization phases.

Innovation Style

Best Buy’s innovation style was based on pushing the limits of an idea to find out how far it could be taken before it ceases to be effective. However, the drawback with this approach is the cost of failure, as was demonstrated by failing to integrate into its core business the high cost acquisition of MusicLand. It is imperative nowadays to validate the assumptions before stretching the limits of the idea in the field- a pure trial-and-error methodology will tend to burn more cash than it will bring in the long run.

Size and make-up of Innovation team

People were too high up in the food chain- directors and senior managers. Why not involve retail managers, or even customer support representatives from the different product lines? Does not seem to be participatory bottom-up, but is more oriented towards strategy formulation by senior management without significant representation of the lower ranks.

Generally, speaking

1.     35 is too many for a static team, however, this was a dynamic team that reconfigured itself at each new step in the innovation process

2.     Multiple viewpoints from a large team from cross functional domains serve the process better

3.     Even a single new idea coming from this team would have served the purpose for a new business innovation

4.     More people might have been better from a product development standpoint- diversity is key here. Operational viewpoint also reflected in addition to business development

Strategos role

Strategos coaches played an advisory role, and from a strategy-input perspective- a rather perfunctory role. They laid out the innovation and achievement model, but did leave the gory details to the teams. Consultants are viewed as experts and are usually the ones not only setting the overall direction, but also working alongside the firm’s employees in achieving the first-level milestones. Strategos did participate more at the end of the Action lab cross-questioning the venture pitches from the various teams. This would have been extremely useful to the teams.

Future of Innovation at BestBuy

Best Buy must continue with the innovation capability internally built, maintained and improved by its own employees, who now get a direct stake in the success as they are assigned key responsibilities in leading the charge. Advantages of going with the 35 innovation mentors that worked with Strategos include strategy/task-ownership on part of the employees, purpose behind putting the necessary hard work for identifying, prototyping, presenting, defending and realizing the ideas.

Cons of acquiring innovation externally via acquisitions or via consultants include problems with integrating these into core capabilities; especially, since these germinated outside Best Buy. Ownership of managing the integration, acquisition will come to be seen as administrative overhead by those who are creatively inclined and are passionate about the innovation model Strategos introduced.

To this effect, Best Buy should discontinue Strategos, but not its innovation methodology. It is beneficial to have the venture-funding type model for germinating and realizing new ideas- creates a young-startup type feel for the firm, senior managers take interest in implementation of the new ideas more than simply maintaining the old business models. Expands the pie eventually. An option is Use the 35 people and consult with Strategos periodically. It is also wise to start from a hypothesis for each SBU, however, the drawback is entirely new ideas will have difficulty surfacing soon enough. One option is to start from a current failure- why did integration of MusicLabs fail? It is okay to focus on hypothesis driven problem-solving, however, lasting innovation has been proven to result following a process of discovery.

An option is to involve Strategos to help fix the problem using a generic innovation solution- figure out why integration failed. Leverage the innovation mentors- 35 count- to lead the charge for similar projects throughout the firm. However, check in with Strategos periodically to determine suitability, best practices and use their general know-how in the process. The problem facing Best Buy is the classic bottom up vs top down strategy formulation- should it look at what is already used in the trenches and try to improve upon it- by drawing from it, or should it start fresh and diverge as much as possible using brand new visions and ideas, before it converges to a few business-worthy ones.

Strategos did teach Best Buy how to catch their own fish proverbially by remaining hands-off to a large extent. This made the idea adoption is easier because the ideas came from Best Buy leaders.

Best Buy needs to be patient. Whirlpool gave itself 5 years to bring innovative ideas to market- takes time- but drove 25% of sales from the new ideas.

And don’t forget to de-risk the new ideas. DE-RISKING is the last phase of the innovation process. More on de-risking on this blog site!

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Strategy models: Resource-based and Dynamic Capabilities

Resource-based Strategy

This strategy approach focuses on the rents accruing to a firm that owns scarce resources rather than the economic profits from product market positioning. In this view, the competitive advantages lie upstream of product markets, and rest on the firm’s idiosyncratic and difficult-to-imitate resources. Research has shown that intra-industry differences in profits are greater, in general, than inter-industry differences in profits. This suggests that firm-specific factors might have more bearing on profits than previously thought, and also that industry conditions, competitive maneuvers and external effects might be relatively unimportant.

Comparing this approach with Porter’s Five Forces, an entry decision for a firm looks approximately as follows (Teece, 1997):

  1. Pick an industry based on its structural attractiveness,
  2. Choose an entry strategy based on a hypothesis of rival strategies (rational hopefully)
  3. Acquire the needed assets to compete in the market

From the resource-based perspective, firms are different with respect to their capabilities, resources and endowments. Plus, the assets are sticky to the firm, in the short run the likelihood of the firm losing the added value of the differentiating capabilities is low. This also applies to a lack of assets for the firm, if that happens to be the case. They are stuck with what they have in the short run. This is necessarily true because acquiring new resources is a costly and complicated process for a firm. Further, most assets are not easily exchanged for better ones. Examples abound, but knowledge or ‘know-how’ is the most common! Also important is the firm’s ability to monetize the newly acquired asset to become profitable quickly and show high ROI.

  1. An entry decision in the resources perspective looks like the following:
  2. Identify the firm’s unique resources
  3. Decide in which markets those resources can earn the highest returns, and
  4. Decide whether the returns or rents from the assets are most efficiently utilized by integrating into related markets, selling the relevant intermediate output to related firms, or selling the assets themselves to a firm in related businesses.

In this view, managing the scarce, not easy to imitate firm-specific resources such as human capital, patents, processes and internal controls and such, clearly becomes the most crucial and fundamental strategic issue. Skill acquisition, talent management, knowledge management and learning are the strategic drivers for the firm.

Dynamic Capabilities

IBM, Texas Instruments, Philips and other well-known firms have followed a resource-based strategy of collecting technology assets, guarded by an aggressive intellectual property stance. However, this strategy alone is not enough to support a significant and sustainable competitive advantage against a changing technology landscape, extremely low barriers to entry and never-before-seen levels of market fragmentation. New competitors in the technology space pop up every single day in the market!

The winners in the global marketplace were those that could demonstrate timely responsiveness and product innovation along with the management capability to efficiently deploy resources, internal competencies and external partnerships to ensure success. Simply building an inventory of technology assets was not enough!

The abilities of a firm to achieve new flavors of competitive advantage are collectively referred to by Teece, Pisano and Sheun as “dynamic capabilities”. The term dynamic refers to the capacity to renew competences so as to achieve congruence with the changing business environment. This approach considers that capabilities cannot be bought in most cases, but must be built, and that strategy involves choosing  and committing to long-term trajectories for building competencies.

Porter’s Focus strategy, as applied to the dynamic capabilities, needs to be defined in terms of distinctive competences NOT products. Products are considered manifestation of competences. The capabilities approach places emphasis on the internal processes that a firm utilizes, how these are deployed and how these will be enhanced into future capabilities.

In comparison with Shapiro’s game theoretic strategy formulation, the capabilities approach has the benefit of indicating that competitive advantage is not just a function of how one plays the game; it is also a function of the assets available to the players, and how these assets can be deployed, and in what configurations in a changing market.

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Strategy models: Five Forces and Game Theory, a narrative in comparison

Competitive Forces

The dominant strategy paradigm in the 1980s, the competitive forces approach pioneered by Michael Porter views the essence of competitive strategy formulation as relating a company to its industry in which it competes, the strategic group it is part of and its competitors. Five forces- entry barriers, threat of substitutes, buyer bargaining power, supplier bargaining power and rivalry among firms- determine the inherent profit potential of an industry. The focus of the analysis is to find a “holding” location for the firm, or a “resting area” in which the firm can defend itself against competitive forces, influence buyers and suppliers events in its favor and find ways to become and remain profitable.

Assumptions in this strategy model are as follows- economic rents are monopoly rents, firms earn rents when they impede the competitive forces which tend to drive economic returns to zero, industries or subsectors of industries become more attractive if they have structural impediments to competitive forces, rents are created largely at the industry or subsector level rather than at the firm level.

This approach to strategy was incubated inside the field of industrial organization and in particular, the industrial structure school of Mason and Bain. In competitive environments characterized by stable structural barriers, the five forces may become determinants of industry-level profitability. However, competitive advantage is difficult to ascertain where rapid technological change is happening, and where certain firm-assets, such as patents or offshore delivery teams, can be expected to play a larger role in explaining economic rents to a firm.

Strategic Conflict

This approach uses the tools of game theory to analyze the competitive interaction between competing firms to reveal how a firm can influence the behavior and actions of rivals and eventually, the market- prices, quantities, profits, beliefs of customers, rivals, costs or speed of entry into the industry. Examples of game theoretic moves include investments in capacity, the “cross-parry”, online and print advertising, product announcements, preemptive product strategy and oversees market entry. However, to be successful in deterring or derailing competitive response, these strategic moves require irreversible commitments and will fall flat if they can be reversed without incurring substantial financial hardship. The hope remains to increase profits by manipulating the market conditions the firm is a part of.

Strategic moves can also be aimed at influencing competing firm behavior, via signaling techniques that include predatory and limit pricing, launch announcement, capacity addition. Cooperating with firms that are not a direct threat in order to advance market share is another strategic move emanating from this paradigm.

However, game theory is unable to crystallize the strategic options available to a firm in entirety. The game theoretic models admit multiple equilibria, and conclude with a wide range of choices for choosing the appropriate game form to be used. The results of the modeling often depend on the assumptions about what another competitor will do in a particular situation. The externalities not identified in the game specification are assumed to have no effect on the  outcome- the strategy recommendation, while we all know that these very externalities, such as rapid technological, political, social and market changes are usually responsible for the way most firms perform.

This paradigm of strategy formulation is more apt for situations where the competitors are more “alike” than different, and where the competitive positions are more delicately balanced, as with Coke and Pepsi. However, applicability of game theoretic strategy formulation will rapidly decline in industries where there is rapid technological change and fast-shifting market conditions.

Problematic with the game theoretic approach to strategy is the manager’s fascination with Machiavellian tricks that will distract her from seeking to build a sustainable competitive advantage using the firms existing “capabilities”, and from protecting the unique skills and abilities available within the firm.

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Notes from Porter’s Competitive Strategy: buyers, suppliers, structural analysis

Strategy toward Buyers and Suppliers

Buyer selection

“different purchasing needs are one reason why buyers have different structural bargaining power.”

“the costs of servicing individual buyers differ..as a result.. buyer selection- the choice of target buyers- becomes an important strategic variable.”

“Buyer selection with attention to structural considerations is an especially important strategic variable in mature industries and in those where barriers caused by product differentiation or technological innovation are hard to sustain.”

“Structural position- a criterion to determine quality of buyers- includes intrinsic bargaining power, and a propensity to exercise this bargaining power in demanding low prices.”

“..unexercised power is a threat that can be unleashed by industry evolution.”

Price sensitivity of buyers

“If buyers are very well informed about the state of demand and suppliers’ costs, they can be ruthless price bargainers.”

“The motivation of the actual decision maker (buyer) is not narrowly defined as the cost of inputs.”

“large buyers are not necessarily the most price sensitive..they might be willing to pay a premium for reliability and for keeping service costs limited to one supplier.”

Buyer selection and strategy

“A firm with high product differentiation may be able to sell to good buyers that are unavailable to many of its competitors..”

“Without a cost advantage, the firm must focus its efforts on buyers who are less price sensitive if it is to outperform the industry average.. if the firm cannot achieve cost leadership, it must be careful not to become stuck in the middle by selling to powerful buyers.”

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Notes from Porter’s Competitive Strategy: profiling, signaling

A Framework for Competitor Analysis

“There are four components to a competitor analysis: future goals, current strategy, assumptions and capabilities.”

The competitor response profile

“The first step is to predict the strategic changes the competitor might initiate.”

“a move that will allow a competitor to share costs with another division, thereby dramatically reducing its relative cost position, may be a lot more significant than a move that leads to an incremental gain in marketing effectiveness.”

“what moves have asymmetrical profit consequences, i.e., affect a competitor’s profits more or less than they affect the initiating firm’s?”

“find a strategy that competitor’s are frozen from reacting to given their present circumstances.”

“Another key strategic concept is creating a situation of mixed motives, or conflicting goals for competitors. This strategy involves finding moves for which retaliation, though effective, would hurt the competitor’s broader position.”

Market Signals

“A prerequisite to interpreting signals accurately is to develop a baseline competitor analysis.”

“Reading market signals, a second-order form of competitor analysis, rests on subtle judgments about competitors based on the comparison of known aspects of their situations with their behavior.”

“announcements can be tests of competitor sentiments, taking advantage of the fact that they need not necessarily be carried out.”

“a sixth function of announcements is to avoid costly simultaneous moves in areas like capacity additions, where bunching of new plant additions would lead to overcapacity.”

The cross-parry

“When one firm initiates a move in one area and a competitor responds in a different area with one that affects the initiating firm..”

“the cross-parry response represents a choice by the defending firm not to counter the initial move directly but to counter it indirectly.”

“the cross-parry can be a particularly effective way to discipline a competitor if there is a great divergence of market shares.”

“maintaining a small position in cross-markets can be a useful potential deterrent.”

Competitive Moves

Industry instability: the likelihood of competitive warfare

“The underlying structure of an industry determines the intensity of rivalry..”

“The greater the number of competitors, the more equal their relative power, the more standardized their products, the higher their fixed costs and other conditions that tempt them to try to fill capacity, and the slower the industry’s growth, the greater is the likelihood that there will be repeated efforts by firms to pursue their own self-interest.”

“Multiple bargaining areas, or situations where firms are interacting in more than one competitive arena, can also facilitate a stable outcome in an industry.”

“Industry structure influences the position of the competitors, the pressures on them to make aggressive moves, and the degree to which their interests are likely to conflict.”

Competitive moves

“When making moves whose success is contingent on competitors following, the risk is that competitors will not follow.”

“Lags in retaliation stem from.. an inability to pinpoint retaliation, which raises its short-run cost.”

“From a defensive point of view perceptual lags may be shortened by having a competitor monitoring system in place which continually assembles data from the field salesforce, distributors, and so on.”

“If a firm can find moves that are much less costly for it to make than they are for its competitors to respond to, it can produce lags in retaliation..”

“commitment can deter retaliation, create trust and deter threatening moves..”

Communicating commitment

“Discipline mechanisms include cash reserves, excess production capacity, a large corps of salespersons, extensive research facilities, small positions in a competitor’s other businesses, and fighting brands.”

“Thomas Schelling’s work on game theory suggests that an important part of reaching an outcome is the discovery of a focal point, or some prominent resting place on which the competitive process can converge its expectations.”

“Focal points can take the form of logical price points, percentage markup pricing rules, round-number divisions of market shares, informal sharing of the market on some basis, etc”

“firms should seek to identify a desirable focal point as early as possible.”

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Notes from Porter’s Competitive Strategy: structure, generic strategies

I have been reading the book for a few months now, albeit at a rather lethargic pace. In my defense, a lot has been going on at professional, academic and personal fronts. Here is a compilation of highlights from the book organized by topics. This is just the beginning, more posts will follow covering the later chapters.

Structural Analysis of Industries

Structural Determinants

“Competition in an industry continually works to drive down the rate of return on invested capital toward the competitive floor rate of return.”

“The focus of structural analysis is on identifying the basic, underlying characteristics of an industry rooted in its economics and technology that shape the arena in which competitive strategy can be set.”

Threat of entry

“Acquisition into an industry with intent to build market position should probably be viewed as entry even though new entirely new entity is created.”

Barriers to entry

“Economics of scale refer to declines in unit costs of a product as the absolute volume per period increases.”

“A type of economies of scale entry barrier occurs when there are economies to vertical integration, i.e., operating in successive stages of production or distribution. Here the entrant must enter integrated or face a cost disadvantage.”

“Economies of scale are dependent on volume per period, and not on cumulative volume, and are very different analytically from experience.”

Expected retaliation

“Conditions that signal the strong likelihood of retaliation to entry and hence deter it are excess cash and unused borrowing capacity.”

Intensive rivalry among existing competitors

“Firms viewing a market as an outlet for excess capacity will adopt policies contrary to those of firms viewing the market as a primary one.”

“When exit barriers are high, excess capacity does not leave the industry, and companies that lose the competitive battle do not give up.”

Pressure from substitute products

“Substitute products that deserve the most attention are those that are subject to trends improving their price-performance trade-off with the industry’s product, or are produced by industries earning high profits.”

Bargaining power

“Buyers sometimes engage in the practice of tapered integration, producing some of their needs for a given component in-house and purchasing the rest from outside suppliers.”

“We usually think of suppliers as other firms, but labor is a supplier as well, and one that exerts great power in many industries.”

Generic Competitive Strategies

Overall cost leadership

“A low-cost position protects the firm against all five competitive forces because bargaining can only continue to erode profits until those of the next most efficient competitor are eliminated, and because the less efficient competitors will suffer first in the face of competitive pressures.”

Differentiation

“is creating something that is perceived industry-wide as being unique.”

“provides insulation against competitive rivalry because of brand loyalty by customers and resulting lower sensitivity to price.”

Focus

“The entire focus strategy is built around serving a particular target industry very well, and each functional policy is developed with this in mind.”

“A firm’s focus means that the firm either has a low cost position with its strategic target, high differentiation, or both. Focus may also be used to select targets least vulnerable to substitutes or where competitors are the weakest.”

“Focus necessarily involves a trade-off between profitability and sales volume.”

Stuck in the middle

” The firm failing to develop its strategy in at least one of the three directions is a firm that is stuck in the middle. This is an extremely poor strategic situation.”

“it must take the steps necessary to achieve cost leadership or at least cost parity, or it must orient itself to a particular target (focus) or achieve some uniqueness (differentiation).”

“the U-shaped relationship between profitability and market share does not hold for every industry.  In some there is often an inverse relationship between market share and profitability. ”

“There is no single relationship between profitability and market share..”

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Business Strategies: Vertical Integration Vs. Ecosystems

James Moore defined a business ecosystem as a network of organizations and individuals that co-evolve their capabilities and roles and align their investments so as to create additional value and improve efficiency.

I attempt to evaluate here whether this form of organization is better to both the traditionally integrated firm and a supply network based on principal-agent relationships. I contend that a vibrant ecosystem enables rapid response to competitive pressures. In particular the following benefits accrue to participants in an ecosystem:

  1. Dynamic reconfiguration of capabilities in response to competition or market changes
  2. Knowledge sharing helps create products with better market fit
  3. Pluggable partner model enables speedy innovations to see light of day
  4. Followership encouraged rather than challenged

Advantages of an ecosystem strategy to lead firm

Assuming the leading firm implements strategies that maximize value derived from the ecosystem, there are numerous benefits attainable:

  1. Meet demand for integrated solutions by mobilizing complementary capabilities
  2. Diminishing need for intervention once key strategic partners are integrated into a self-organizing system
  3. Avoids the costs of acquisitions and subsequent integration thereby helping keep business focus on core competencies
  4. The entire activity chain is setup to harness the knowledge and joint capability of ecosystem participants.

The traditional vertical integration strategy

The strategies that create vertically integrated organizations have certain key benefits including the following:

  1. Ability to align internal suppliers and implement transfer pricing
  2. Reduce supplier or buyer risk
  3. Lower transaction and relative costs
  4. Minimize or eliminate profit leakage to partners

Integration, as Peter Drucker stated, is complexity and only works out, as a rule, if the problem of ‘wrong size’ is addressed, i.e., the firm is too big or small to venture into the area of expertize itself. Even though a firm stays in the same industry it moves into areas it does not have core expertize in and therefore it needs new skills and takes on new risks. Weighing the short and long-term costs of, and payoffs from the integration to arrive at an optimal integration balance- between opportunities and risks- is the only way to be successful using this strategy.

An ecosystem strategy ‘fits’ better

Lets return to my contention that ecosystem strategies are increasingly becoming a better fit for the changing business landscape with firms facing pressure to reduce the current set of core activities. One of the more important strategic goals for small and large firms is cash flow management that requires limiting investments in non-core activities, preferably sourcing those operations from strategic partners. However, outsourcing as a general trend is slowing down in favor of using more reliable and mutually dependent partners. This is probably due to the closer and more complicated interactions needed to best competitors today; lock step with suppliers is harder to achieve in the offshore model.

Another driver for increasing suitability of ecosystem strategies is the need for reconfiguring activity chains to meet consumer demands. Subcontracting relationships, including offshore contracts, are slow moving entities that are not easy to change or reconfigure without sufficient handholding by the lead firm. Another issue is with changing requirements that are harder to build into contracts and require a more favorable climate of partners who are amenable to changing specifications deeper into the product or service cycle. This new model of employing “pluggable partners” into the product development cycle helps decrease time to market and gives the lead firm considerable flexibility in meeting consumer demands. This also helps remove any defective inputs or parts by replacing the supplier with another one from the ecosystem with a better track record in quality.

Followership in the context of pricing and product is another lesser-known advantage of an ecosystem strategy. If the leading firm plays it right, partners do not feel threatened by the ecosystem. Their individual product niches are not invaded and they could even continue to compete with a similar product line albeit differentiated sufficiently in order to remain an ecosystem participant.

 

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Strategy for Security: A Pure Bargaining Model

The Stalemate

Strategy development can be thought of as a form of bargaining in my opinion, where security and audit, each with a stake in the successful implementation of the strategy, arrive at the table with specific agenda, putting forth and withdrawing arguments, driven by expectations of what the applications, infrastructure and support teams will accept or reject, and depart the table with an agreement that satisfies fewer goals than what they hoped to achieve to begin with.

Formulation of a roadmap for enterprise security is not concerned with the efficient application of forces like power and influence, as much as with the exploitation of potential synergies coming from the combined gain at stake for all involved. It is concerned with the possibility that particular architecture-driven operational outcomes are better (not worse) for all parties involved.

‘Pure’ Bargaining

Achieving consensus on a strategic roadmap for enterprise security can be modeled as a form of pure bargaining- a term used to describe bargaining in which each party is guided mainly by his expectations of what the other will accept. With each party guided by expectations and knowing very well that the others are guided by expectations too, these very expectations begin compounding achieving an effect that leaves only one exit path, someone making a final and sufficient concession to resolve the deadlock.

This result is quite contrary to the fact that actually, there is a range of possible architectures of which any single one is acceptable to all parties than no agreement at all. To insist on any one of the agreeable alternatives is a form of pure bargaining, since either party would take less than their dream solution than nothing at all because that would only cost money, and it leaves the firm no better off than what it started with. Either party would take ‘less’ also because it knows that ‘receding’ to reach agreement is also an option at any point in the process, since there is no reprimand for agreeing after disagreeing!

The underlying tactical approach is especially suited to Security because the essence of pure bargaining tactics employed is the voluntary and irreversible sacrifice of a position of strength in order to reach a point of advantage, even though the advantage is somewhat diluted. It is the paradox that the power to limit the adversarial parties stems from an ability to confine oneself to a smaller range of choices- to give up some freedom of choice to gain leverage in a pure bargaining situation.

Quick Case Study: Authentication Strategy

Case in point is creating a strategy for achieving seamless authentication across the enterprise. The applications architect might not want a reverse proxy solution for an authentication gateway because he already owns a farm of proxy servers that service web requests for his applications. He prefers an approach that augments the existing technology instead of stacking another farm of reverse proxies in front! The security architect advocates the use of a virtualized object space that a reverse proxy enables you to create because it helps manage authorization in the long run. The audit manager cares more about the security perimeter than the specific technology stack within the perimeter. The infrastructure architect wants homogeneity in hardware across the technology stack to ensure his team has a manageable learning curve in order to support the solution. The helpdesk manager is worried about how users might be impacted no matter which alternative is picked as the authentication architecture.

In the scenario depicted above, the application architect is negotiating from a position of strength because he owns the applications, the infrastructure architect is also negotiating from a strong position because his stake is already in the ground- a certain type and model of hardware is powering the business applications! However, they don’t just get their way because the security architect has a point too. Creating a single reverse-proxy based gateway eliminates any instrumentation at the proxies the applications architect owns, and also provides a long run alternative to finer grained authorization should the business need it. The audit manager might appear to be neutral to the discussion, but knows that adding a reverse proxy widens the security perimeter and requires thorough security compliance certification of the reverse proxy servers. This is more work and more risk for an otherwise smoothly running firm!

Strategic Moves shrink the ZOPA

I would be remiss if I did not talk about how the perceived bargaining set for each of the participants changes at each bargaining step, and also how the parties who were in a position of strength change their expectations in observation of how well others accept or reject their ‘shifting’ bottom-line or ‘reservation price’ demands. The zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) initially is very large as all parties in positions of strength seem to have inflated perceptions of their non-cooperative alternatives and won’t give in without a fight. Pure bargaining tells us that someone has to concede for the stalemate to be resolved in the favor of achieving a ‘surplus’ outcome- one that results in all parties gaining something by participating in the process. At each bargaining step the zone of possible agreement shrinks as the weaker participant, the security architect evaluates the expectations of the stronger parties, navigates the terrain, uses his expertize to model impact to business, to user and to long run utility of choosing between the different alternatives to not only improve his alternative but also to worsen the other side’s alternatives at the same time.

The Concession

Experience reveals that the application and infrastructure architects have to let go, albeit selectively, of their biases towards pure proxy and homogenous hardware to accommodate the setting up of a reverse proxy as best response for a segment of applications duly benefiting from one, and an alternative solution like a plugin for proxy servers that is a best-response to another segment of applications. The audit manager has no choice but to add to his inventory of tasks the ‘seal-and-certify’ of all new components to avoid triggering an end-of-year audit. The helpdesk manager also will duly ask for process flow and user impact analysis from all parties concerned. Examples illustrating pure bargaining tactics abound in security strategy formulation.

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Analysis of Precedent Transactions for M&A

Recently, for an M&A assignment I did an analysis of precedent transactions for NetSuite’s acquisition by Oracle. A precedent transactions analysis is designed to imply a value of a company based on publicly available financial terms and premiums paid for carefully selected transactions from the M&A ‘universe’. The comparable transactions must share basic characteristics with the acquisition such as common industry, markets targets operated in, market capitalization and similar product lines. In connection with my analysis, I compared publicly available statistics for select software sector transactions with a value of greater than $500 million occurring between January 1, 2010 and December 1, 2012.

The deals selected for analysis were Rightnow Technologies, Taleo Corporation, Eloqua and Art Technology Group acquired by Oracle, and SuccessFactors acquired by SAP AG.

For each transaction listed above, I noted the following financial statistics, where available:

  1. implied premium to the acquired company’s closing share price on the last trading day prior to announcement (or the last trading day prior to the share price being affected by acquisition rumors or similar merger-related news)
  2. implied premium to the acquired company’s 30 trading day average closing share price prior to announcement (or the last trading day prior to the share price being affected by acquisition rumors or similar merger-related news)
  3. implied premium to the acquired company’s 60 trading day average closing share price prior to announcement.
Premium to 1-Day Prior Closing Share Price
Premium to 30-Day Average Closing Share Price
Premium to 60-day Average Closing Share Price
Target
Acquirer
Rightnow Technologies, Inc
Oracle
20%
25%
33%
Taleo Corporation
Oracle
18%
25%
20%
Eloqua2
Oracle
31%
30%
25%
Success Factors, Inc.
SAP
52%
52%
50%
Art Technology Group, Inc.
Oracle
43%
44%
56%
High
52.00%
52.00%
56.00%
Mean
32.80%
35.20%
36.80%
Median
31.00%
30.00%
33.00%
Low
18.00%
25.00%
20.00%
Top Quartile
43%
44%
50%
The price paid per outstanding share of common stock of the target firms is tabulated below:
 
Net Debt[1] ($MM)
Enterprise Value ($MM)
Price Per Share
Equity Value ($MM)
Target
Acquirer
 
Rightnow Technologies, Inc
Oracle
$43.00
$1,434.12
$(2.75)
$1,431.37
Taleo Corporation
Oracle
$46.00
$1,937.61
$(115.27)
$1,822.34
Eloqua
Oracle
$23.50
$835.45
$(4.95)
$830.51
Success Factors, Inc.
SAP
$40.00
$3,240.95
$(89.23)
$3,151.72
Art Technology Group, Inc.
Oracle
$6.00
$957.80
$(54.89)
$902.91
High
$46.00
$3,240.95
$(2.75)
$3,151.72
Mean
$31.70
$1,681.19
$(53.42)
$1,627.77
Median
$40.00
$1,434.12
$(54.89)
$1,431.37
Low
$6.00
$835.45
$(115.27)
$830.51
Top Quartile
$43.00
$1,937.61
$(4.95)
$1,822.34

The table summarizing multiples and LTM profitability benchmarks is listed here:

Enterprise Value Multiples
Equity Value Multiples
LTM Profitability Margins
Sales
EBITDA
EBIT
LTM N.I.
Book Value
Gross Profit (%)
EBITDA (%)
N.I. (%)
Target
NetSuite
69.06%
-6.88%
-11.41%
Rightnow Technologies, Inc
0.130x
0.014x
0.009x
0.020x
0.056x
70.32%
10.77%
15.30%
Taleo Corporation
0.170x
0.008x
-0.011x
-0.009x
0.196x
68.64%
4.74%
-5.53%
Eloqua
0.083x
-0.007x
-0.008x
-0.009x
0.089x
70.20%
-7.74%
10.61%
Success Factors, Inc.
0.104x
-0.016x
-0.018x
-0.011x
0.128x
66.00%
-15.07%
-10.96%
Art Technology Group, Inc.
0.199x
0.029x
0.019x
0.018x
0.142x
66.04%
14.48%
9.34%
High
0.199x
0.029x
0.019x
0.020x
0.196x
70.32%
14.48%
15.30%
Mean
0.137x
0.006x
-0.002x
0.002x
0.122x
68.24%
1.43%
3.75%
Median
0.130x
0.008x
-0.008x
-0.009x
0.128x
68.64%
4.74%
9.34%
Low
0.083x
-0.016x
-0.018x
-0.011x
0.056x
66.00%
-15.07%
-10.96%
Top Quartile
0.170x
0.014x
0.009x
0.018x
0.142x
70.20%
10.77%
10.61%

Based on the analysis of the relevant metrics and time frame for each of the transactions listed above, and further analysis of the relevant metrics for each of the transactions listed above, I selected representative ranges of implied premia and financial multiples of the transactions and applied these ranges of premia and financial multiples to the relevant financial statistic for NetSuite. The following table summarizes the analysis:

Representative Range
  Implied Value Per Share of NetSuite Stock
Precedent Transactions Financial Statistic
Premia
Low
High
Premium to 1-Day Prior Closing Share Price
18.0% – 52.0%
$111.27
$143.34
Premium to 30-Day Average Closing Share Price
25.0% – 44.0%
$110.57
$134.45
Premium to 60-Day Average Closing Share Price
20.0% – 56.0%
 $99.55
$129.41
Enterprise Value Multiples
 
Sales
0.083x – 0.199x
$ 23.72
$ 53.39
Book Value
0.056x – 0.196x
$ 11.07
$ 39.05

I also noted the price per share of NetSuite implied by median and top quartile statistics of the software as a service precedent transactions. The following table summarizes my findings:

Precedent Transactions Financial Statistic
SaaS Median Representative Metric
Implied value per share of NetSuite common stock based on SaaS-Median Statistic
SaaS-Top Quartile Representative Statistic
Implied Value p.s. of NetSuite
based
on Top Quartile
Statistic
Premia
Premium to 1-Day Prior Closing Share Price
31.00%
$123.53
43%
$ 134.85
Premium to 30-Day Average Closing Share Price
30.00%
$114.99
44%
$ 127.38
Premium to 60-Day Average Closing Share Price
33.00%
$110.33
50%
$ 124.43

I noted that the median premia for all of the precedent transactions to the 1-day prior closing share price, 30-day average closing share price and 60-day average closing share price were 31%, 30% and 33%, respectively. I also noted that the closing stock price of NetSuite on 5/18/2013 was $94.30 per share.

No company or transaction utilized in the precedent transactions analysis is identical to the acquisition under analysis. In evaluating the precedent transactions, I made judgments and assumptions with regard to industry performance, general business, market and financial conditions and other matters, which are beyond my control, such as the impact of competition on the business or the industry generally, industry growth and the absence of any adverse material change in the target’s financial condition or the industry or in the financial markets in general, which could affect the public trading value of the companies and the aggregate value and equity value of the transactions to which they are being compared.


[1] NetSuite’s closing stock price on 5/14/2013 was $94.3. On February 26, 2013, 73,253,126 shares of the registrant’s Common Stock, $0.01 par value, were issued and outstanding.

[2] Eloqua: all financial data as of Sept 30, 2012

[3] Net debt = financial debt (short- and long-term) + non-convertible preferred stock (at liquidation value) + out-of-the-money convertible securities + capital leases + non-controlling interest − cash and equivalents

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